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HEARING ON GENETIC ENGINEERING: BENEFITS 
AND POTENTIAL HEALTH HAZARDS 
Tuesday, December 1, 1981 
Sacramento, California 
CHAIRMAN ART TORRES: Over the years, new genetic 
technologies have been developed that allow researchers the ability 
to manipulate the characteristics of micro-organisms. 
These techniques are referred to as gene splicing or more correctly 
genetic engineering. Products such as bio-synthetic insulin, 
erferon and human growth hormone, developed by genetic engineer-
ing, illustrate that laboratory techniques once considered experi-
mental now have practical application. Genetic engineering is no 
longer just a laboratory exercise,but is now a major tool of science 
with vast industrial applications. Projections for the pharmaceuti-
cal industry alone indicate a $3 billion United States market for 
recombinant DNA products by 1990. 
Although no evidence exists that any harmful organism 
has ever been created by genetic engineering, most experts believe 
that some risk is associated with its activities. Because of the 
poss ity of these risks, the National Institute of Health has 
prohibited certain recombinant DNA experiments and restricted others. 
The issue of whether to regulate genetic engineering and 
so, to what extent, defies, ln my opinion, a simple solution. 
Today~~~a\LelJ though -=the_ physical risks of DNl\ research are genel'ally 
considered to be less than originally feared, it is appropriate at 
s time, I believe, in California to review these activities to 
determine whether state regulation is required to prevent what may 
be a major potential health hazard. 
Today's be devoted to 
engineering and how industry is ut iz 
We will also hear testimony on the proposed 
the nature of genet eng act e 
California. 
I'd like to call on our 
Rutter, who is of the 
of California at San Francisco, who' go 
of genet engineering and current research 






Dr. \A]i l 
like to then call upon Mr. Tom Genentech, Inc. s 
here? Please come forward. Dr. Irv 
Eli lly Research 
well. And Dr. Herbert s 
s 
at Hoffman-LaRoche, would you eas 
here and we'll 
MR. TOM KILEY: Mr. 
I'm Tom V Pres 
Genentech a Cal company 
DNA techno 
to, was for 
to the public the benef c 
a human hormone. In 
States the then - s 
Sc ences led that 






the products of Genentech researchers. Thymosin Alpha l, which is 
in, an intermediate form of 
, bovine and porcine 
iency in meat and milk product-
t later resulted from Genentech researchers. More recently we've 
announced the 
substance of potent 
1on of human calcitonin which is a 
use 1n the treatment of 's Disease, 
possibly one that may prove useful in the treatment of senile bone 
embrittlement as wel This year the Secretary of Agriculture 
announced that, as a result of a scient collaborat between 
USDA and Genentech, bacteria had produced a vaccine for foot-mouth 
sease which is a disease of very substantial dimensions outside 
the United States. Just a few weeks ago we announced the production 
by microbial means of human serum albumen which is a blood expander, 
the major component of human blood and a substance currently in use 
for the treatment of shock and traumatic injury. 
Genentech has received more approvals for seal 
ion of recombinant DNA products from the National Institutes 
of Health than all other companies in the world combined. We are a 
growing company. 
when human insul 
Formed 1n 1976, not more than a dozen employees 
resulted from our researchers. Today we number 
320 and are continuing to grow. One in every five employees of 
Genentech has a Ph.D. In 1976 the company's facilities occupied 
300 square feet. By year end our research deve ss 
development facilit s will encompass some 144,000 square feet here 
in California with more under construction. We have invested in 
excess of $3 million in capital investment, $20 mil on in this year 
alone. Our research expenditures for the current year will total 
-3-
near $17 million. Although a smal company we're more 
research and development in health and related areas than the 
Mallinckrodt or Rorer in pharmaceuticals or .J. He 
in the food processing industry. 
or S. ~1ark 
We were the first of the new s to prov 
Here the practical benefit from the new 
new companies forming around 
bility of public ownership. It 
to the spons 
to be seen Hhether 
or Eli Lilly will become the company to on the market 
pharmaceutical product of this sc To present t , four 
products of our researches are 
testing. Human growth hormone 
advanced human c 
the treatment of dwarfism in 
children, insulin diabetic treatment co laborat our 




will follow. The insulin case 
later testimony, Dr. Weissbach 
confine myself to a few 
In the past, human 
ll be 
ll to 





hormone for the treatment 
hypopituitary dwarfism or growth hormone def l s ln 
l 
could be human took excess of 50 
pituitaries derived from cadavers to 
treat one child for one year. le s than al 
United States requiring treatment could aeecss the material. 
Although preliminary indications suggest 
hormone u (3. u () 
healing, osteoporosis or senile bone 
bone fracture knitting, unti the pres 
-4-





been a sufficient quant of that material for detailed testing. 
Now that will happen as well. ~enentech itself is conducting the 
ttuman cl cal rials in the ed States with regard to human 
growth hormone. Elsewhere in the world our partner in that research, 
Kabivitrum, hitherto the world's largest supplier of the pituitary 
ved material, lS conducting cl cal trials calculated to PDen 
up the product to the availability of children around the world. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: How widespread would you consider the 
dwarfism problem to be in this country? 
MR. KILEY: It is by pharmaceutical industry standards 
a relatively small market and one therefore nice adapted to 
\;enentech's present means. The far more economically significant 
aspects of human growth hormone will come when and if other indica-
tions are opened up; but to a parent whose child suffers from 
hypopituitary dwarfism, the illness is a great problem indeed. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What timetable do you perceive that a 
pharmaceutical type approach would be available in this country? 
MR. KILEY: Of course, that rests entire ln the hands cf 
the Food and Drug Administration, but optimistically it's possible 
that the product could become available as early as late 1983. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: When you indicated that human studies 
are being done now, what is the nature and the success rate of those 
studies? How have they been conducted? 
MR. KILEY: Well, speaking first as a human subject who 
part the Phase I clinical studies, I can say and offer 
myself as evidence that the product was judged as sufficiently safe to 
go into the next stage of testing in children; and in a number of 
medical centers around the country, children are now receiving the 
-5-
material in so-called Phase II, 
the final phase of test 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All 
MR. KILEY: At a time when act 
federal legislation, there was, I 
and small companies like Genentech 
universit , principally those 
role in the development of s 8 
to my left doubtless will disagree, 
was the small companies 
, a need 
may 
concerns into 20th molecular' 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: seem to e 
DR. IRVING S. JOHNSON: No don 
MR. KILEY: We we 
concerns over ohazard vJer 













tted our company 
enroute to atta 
as a ful int ed 











lon of our business is well. 
centered around the ing needs of the company aimed at becoming 
a fully integrated organization. We're hiring pharmacologists and 
marketing and manufacturing people, process development engineers, 
enzymologists, microbiologists, molecular biologists, organic 
sts at a furious rate because of our intention to become a 
ful integrated company. 
We have from the first concerned ourself the le~aJ and 
related issues arising around the potential applications of genetic 
engineering. We played a key role in the Supreme Court's considera-
tion of the question whether patents could sue on new microorganisms. 
We have cooperated with the National Institutes of Safety and 
Health in their on-going consideration of the question of worker 
safety ln the area. We have the same interest that you do because 
we live in the same state you do and proceeding with all the caution 
that prudent action requires. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What does all that means? That sounds 
very nice, but what does all that mean ln very practical terms? 
What do we tell the public who is confused about genetic engineering 
and its implications? What kinds of safeguards and cautions can 
you publicly give to a Legislature and to its people here in this 
state that those fears or those doubts or that confusion is not well 
founded? 
direction of our Board, we have complied voluntarily with the guide-
lines for recombinant DNA research of the National Institutes of 
Health. Our Director of Manufacturing formerly participated in the 















substitute state regulation for the federal regulation that 
ly is recognized as unnecessary. I'm reminded of a 
letter written by Professor Stanley Cohen of Stanford University to 
Congressman Staggers at a time in 1977 when legislation was under 
consideration in Congress to impose the most stringent regulation 
on this industry, legislation that I think might well have stifled 
much of the creative work that has come since. He quoted in that 
letter some comments by James Watson, the Nobel laureate of Watson 
and Crick fame on prospects for federal regulation of biological 
science, and I would like briefly to read Dr. Watson's remarks: 
"We suffer,"he said, "from the results of a massive miscalculation 
in which we cried wolf without ever having seen or heard one. 
Legislation has been proposed to establish an extensive regulatory 
apparatus to control basic scientific research in an area where 
there is not one shred of evidence to support the view that special 
risks exist or special controls are needed. For recombinant DNA, a 
costly and cumbersome bureaucracy is proposed to govern the content 
and methods of scientific inquiry 1n the absence of any indication 
whatsoever of actual hazard or of any scientific evidence to even 
suggest that a substantial threat to the public health and welfare 
exists." If we are to learn anything from the precedent of govern-
ment- de-re.e;ulat-ion at the level, if a vital, young, new 
industry that was born in California is to flourish in California 
and if the cornucopia is to be permitted to continue unfolding 
products of incalculable value, then I think we should recognize two 
important needs. First, the government of California should continue 
the process this committee has begun to watch carefully over the 
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I'd l to address myself to four s. I'd l 
to tell you a little about what we're doing in genetic engineer-
ing. I'd l to comment brief on the benefits that I think it 
may have, icularly in agriculture, and about safety and a matter 
of international economic competition. 
As Tom Ki 
the ion of 
scale cl 
has mentioned to you, we are involved 
ic human insulin, and we are in very 
of this material, both the United States 
and in Europe. While my from Genentech may have more approvals 
for large-scale production, we had the first one; and I'd like to tell 
you a little bit about why we went into the production of human insulin. 
We were the company the world to bring insulin to the dia-
betic, and we've always felt a special relationship to the diabetic 
population, and we did this in the 1920's. What we perceived this 
field was the fact that we were tied to a by-product of the meat 
industry. The animals are not raised for their glands. They're 
sed as food, and the supply pancreas glands was fairly static 
while the requirements insulin were increasing at a more rapid 
rate. And in fact, the diabet population lS increasing at a more 
rap rate than the population as a whole. You could argue about 
when these 1 s of requirements and supply cross, but they clearly 
were going to cross, and our prediction is that they will probably 
cross the 1990's, and at that time there will be a shortage of 
ln. Genetic engineering clearly gave us an opportunity to have 
a rel le, controllable source of insulin for diabetics which could 
be expanded or contracted as the demand indicated. At the same time, 
we believe there are significant advantages to this material. It is, 
of course, the insulin that occurs in the body, and we have produced 
s in two forms. We've produced it by combining the A and B chains of 
-11-
insulin, and we've produced by 
proinsul which a precursor mo 
that proinsulin is secreted the 
circulating. One of the 
in the last decade or so is that 
for a few very 
logically and bio 
ment therapy that 
to the animal 








available, and we believe that 









time that says that the 
large because 






about erferon, I'd po t 
e 
l 
c3ubs Lance that's known for well over 20 years as an anti-viral 
substance and one of the things this technology has shown which we 
would never have knmvn, never have known, is -that, in fact, there isn't 
just one interferon, but there are a family of them, and there are 
12 and maybe even more genes for interferons, and they're all 
different, and they have different in vitro biological activities, 
and they probably will all see clinical evaluation. 
Antibiot s is an area that we're vitally interested in 
as a tailor-made case for the application of genetic engineering. 
Antibiotics are the end product of a metabolic pathway. This 
pathway essentially converts Substance A to B to C to D and after G 
may be the antibiotic. You may have rate limiting steps ln the 
production of this antibiotic and Substance B may not be produced 
in a large enough quantity. You can literally put in a thousand 
genes for B, or you can accumulate large amounts of these inter-
mediates and use them for chemical modification to create new types 
of antibiotics. 
This technology also allows you to do things that 
evolution has not yet had time to get to. Again, in the case of 
antibiotics, nature has only had time to look at two or three, 
pass four, amino ac as a nucleus for a family of antibiotics 
1 penic lins or cephalosporins. There are 20 that she hasn't 
had time to look at yet, which can now be looked at very quickly. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What timetable do ive to the 
availability of this biosynthetic insulin? 
DR. JOHNSON: Well, it's available now, because as I 
indicated, it's in broad scale clinical trial. What you're really 
asking, I think, is when can we predict a requlatory agency will 
-13-
approve it. I find that to but we 1 
that it's likely that it will be 1982. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You could be 
now based upon the clinical research that s been s 
on-going'? 
DR. JOHNSON: The c res would no 
reason why it could not be 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Cos factor sent 
available and this new biosynthet 
DR. JOHNSON: Cost more expens t 
will eventually be compet precis when 
that will be. As with any new any new ' seal 
up is more of a problem to be. t's not 
unlike a have an 
step synthesis and 10% the end 
compound of 
market years s may be a 9 % 
and the will come down. Al s 
under constant deve s lar 
of development. 
Mr. we 
to v ilence 
evolves at least from state 
DR. JOHNSON: T J_ 
l-idV !J (' er·y L 
I the fact that tant 




of the Recombinant DNA research in this country was excluded from 
the ~u el s, and risk assessment programs have continued under the 
guidelines, and~ ln fact, 's my personal opinion that, more 
e who were the area of infectious diseases then 
had been involved ln the orig ization of the guidelines, they might 
not even have existed. But I think the scientists behaved in a sensi-
ble fashion. We did have a moratorium. We did develop guidelines, 
and I think they've been complied with. I don't think they've serious-
ly inhibited the development of the technology . 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: In terms of State intervention, what do 
you foresee? 
DR. JOHNSON: I would hope that we would not see any 
because I don't really think there's a need for it. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You feel that all precautions are being 
taken voluntarily, as Mr. Kiley indicated, by the industry, and 
therefore, state regulation is not necessary at this time. 
DR. JOHNSON: I do. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Fine. Any further questions of Dr. 
Johnson? I would like to welcome Assemblyman Pat Johnston, who is a 
member of the Health Committee. Thank you very much, Dr. Weissbach. 
DR. HERBERT WEISSBACH: Thank you, Mr. Torres. I'm Herbert 
Weissbach, Associate Director of the LaRoche Institute of Molecular 
Biology, which is part of the Hoffman-LaRoche Research Center. I'd 
like to thank you and the Committee for giving me the opportunity to 
participate in this mornings discussion. 
s to concentrate on another 
application of recombinant DNA technology, and that is specifically 
Interferon. I'm assuming that there may be a need for some background 
-15-
so I'd like to give a brief h tori 




DR. WEISSBACH: I'll be us 
might be clearer to work off s to 
Let me start off by just giving a very s 
which is a protein with ant 
animal cells. The early work on 
ago, and two of the major 
this sl , Isaacs and 
actual discovery of Int 
being done on the events that 
animal cell, and I'll just schemat 
shown on s sl When a v 
cell, there lS a 
les very rap As a 
icles are formed; and 
released--the er number o 
the cell and then can be used 
result, also, that the cell 
often s. It was noted some ? 
infected with a virus, s 
0\l n go 




s 20~ 5 
at the 
Ko The 
stud that were 
substance and this substance lS shown tn lnterfere Wlttl the process 
f viru mult ) on 
for this material. And needle 
have a natural occurr 
were then ed to to 
- 6 
• 
shm, .. m to be a 




the situation arne much 
there was not one, bu 
hown on the lide, ~here arc 
actua ly three major clas es and are called 
accord to the cell that produces the material. Leukocyte comes 
from the buffy coat of the e blood cells. Fibroblast interferon 
is produced connect tissue cells of fibroblast, and immune 
interferon comes from eel s, lymphocytes, which are part of the ant 
body system. And to further complicate the matter, leukocyte inter-
feron is composed of 12 or more interferon spec s, that is, 12 or 
more closely-related which, to put another way, and T 
Dr. Rutter will scuss s' means that there are 12 or 
more enes the e that could be used to make erferon, 
a specific protein. As shown on the bottom of the slide, the initial 
critical stud s were done with interferon, produced either by 
leukocytes .or t, and they were indicative that interferon 
possess anti-viral and -tumor activities. However, studies 
as descr here were limited by the amount of interferon and the 
of the interferon that was used for these studies. For instance, 
mo t of the cl studies, less than one percent pure interferon 
was used; and this, of course, 1 ed the conclusions that could be 
reached from these es. 
s is really a natural for recombinanct DNA technology, 
and LaRoche was particularly erested in this process, that is to 
interferon by recombinant DNA technology. Mainly because 
some of LaRoche's scientists have been involved in interferon research 
for more than 10 years and recombinant DNA technology is being done 
at LaRoche Institute of Molecular Biology, several years ago a 
program was initiated to accomplish this and then three years ago, 
-17-
Roche initiated also, a scientific 
mentioned, with Genentech to facil 
by recombinant DNA technology. 
, that Tom Kil 
lon of 
Let me go through now the I had that 
Dr. Rutter would have given the basic sc before, but I'll ust 
try to go through this very We'll use a human 
as an example here, and the old way was to take the cell which 
contains the gene or in the case of a leukocyte, the genes, to 
duce interferon and induce the cell to make , expose 
a virus. The interferon is secreted from the cell and then one 
could theoret l purify the interferon e Th l 
with this procedure was that: (l) 'shard to amounts 
of white blood cells, (2) the cells would a lot of 
interferon, and (3) the purificat of these small amounts was 
very difficult and especially the fact that what 
produced was a mixture of a dozen or more 
species pure was practically ss 
to 
could be done 
with a long-extended effort. 
the leukocyte make the 
organism that would produce 
technique of recombinant DNA 
start out with one gene, 
basically, what is done is that 






a vector s 
plasmid that no¥7 contains the interferon gene and the gene can be 
obtained in one of several ways. The vector can then be 
organism such as the E.Coli, shown here, and s is a 
organism now has the erferon the organ1sm be 
grown, fermented, and l es 
- 8-
n 
I !1 i c; v , you can r;r•ow t:iTHOUfltS 
Secondly, the can 
be eng properly to amounts of interferon, and 
's much eas to isolate the interferon. In addition, what can 
done with one gene, can be done with all 12 genes or more, so that 
you end up 2 d cells, now capable of a 
spec erferon. 
the end of last year, it was possible to take one of 
these cells, one clone erferon gene, and extensively 
to produce large enough amounts and work out a 
pure interferon that 
of this year, 
could consider clinical s. In 
was obtained for Phase I studies and 
a tentative clinical timetable is shown in the next slide. What 
began January called Phase I studies, and there was one spec s 
of interferon produced by recombinant DNA technology. And the 
purpose of Phase I studies is s to define the safety of the drug, 
what dosages can be g , and very important, pharmacology--what 
of blood levels do you 
Very recently, 
when you give the drug to patients. 
has been obtained to start Phase II 
s which are 
1 be used 
at efficacy, and we'll 
the Phase II study. And 
scuss the diseases 
all goes well, 
lS that Phase III s es may initiate sometime in 1983; and 
there are no ications, the anticipated timetable is 
that new be in 1984-1985. But I'd like to real 
stress that this is a tentative schedule. The clinical studies are 
real at an early stage and many factors could certainly influence 
s t 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: And once this is available on the market, 
-19-
what kind of message will the beautiful ads the 
in Medical Economics and other physic 
of what this drug will do? 
magaz 
companies 
s tell that 
DR. WEISSBACH: I will attempt to at least des be 
diseases that are going to be tested during Phase II and Phase III. 
And this a partial st and includes 
cies~ breast, lung, colon, lymphoma, and 
types of mal 
myeloma, and ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Cancer of the breast, cancer of the 
and cancer of the colon ... 
DR. WEISSBACH: Yes, exactly, and some viral diseases: 
Herpes Zoster, Herpes Keratitis, an eye ect , chronic hepat 
B will all be tested during Phase II 
Phase III studies will hopefully 
extend them if possible. 
s for , and the 
the results of Phase I 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Now, under the categories-
Zoster, Herpes Keratitis, and 
pharmacological remedy for those v 
is B- at nresent there is no 
is that r ? 
DR. WEISSBACH: There are not ones. s Kerat l 
there is a drug that is used. s Zoster, to my knowl 
is not adequate treatment. s is caused the same sm, 
virus, that causes Chicken Pox; lS B, 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: were e s 
to be investigated? I can understand concern the 
Hhich a large portion of the population is coming up with. 
DR. WEISSBACH: Chronic B is real a ma or 
health problem throughout the world. There may be a hundred 
people who are suffering from is s v lS 
a di virus to handle. t' 
-20-
so these are obvious, I think, viral diseases to look into. 
Okiiy, T'rJ ju ik ze now. The last slide, 
namely that recomb DNA has been successfully used to 
interferon and what was not mentioned in one of the previous slides, 
that a second form of leukocyte interferon is now in Phase I studies 
while the first interferon is going to Phase II studies. Clinical 
studies have been initiated so with two clinical, with two leukocyte 
interferons, and the Phase II studies will now determine whether or 
not the material is really active as an anti-tumor or anti-viral agent. 
And as mentioned before, if it lS clinically effective, a reasonable 
timeable would be 1984 to 1985 for this to be a drug. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: When you say clinically effectively, does 
that mean stopping the cancer of lungs, or colons, or breasts? 
DR. WEISSBACH: Yes, there are some guidelines that the 
clinicians use, which I am not that familiar with in terms of the 
amounts of regression. For instance, if there's 50% decrease in 
the size of the tumor, that is considered -- when you see that, 's 
considered clinically effective. With the viral diseases, there are 
very often viral markings that you can look for, that are present 
the patient who has the infection that you can see disappear if 
the drug is effective. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What safeguards is Hoffman-LaRoche taking 
ln terms of genetic eng and the work that you are doing? 
DR. WEISSBACH: I think this has come up before. To my 
knowledge, Roche, as well as all the other companies, have been 
following the NIH guidelines to the letter since the beginning of 
1976, and certainly have done that. We have an Institutional 
Biosafety Committee, we use the containment regulations, or follow 
-21-
those that have been put forth by the NIH. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you very much. I'd like to welcome 
Herschel Rosenthal, who is the senior member of the Assembly Health 
Committee. Dr. Rutter, welcome. 
DR. WILLIAM RUTTER: Thank you. My apologies for being 
late. I think my objectives this morning are to discuss with you 
something about the general principles of genetic engineering, of 
bio-technology. I'd like to offer a few examples of how universities 
contribute to the development of this field and finally mention, 
just in a few words, one additional evidence of the utility of this 
technology in solving problems facing mankind. Now with respect to 
the issue itself, genetic engineering, I thought it was easier to 
use slides as well and first start with the DNA molecule. 
You know the magic that is found in all living organisms 
is contributed by proteins, that is to say, proteins do the work of 
the organism, and they contribute to the metabolism, how things are 
digested and reconverted into the elements which make our bodies do 
what is magical about our bodies. Now genetics is the science which 
deals with the capability of peroetuating this working system, that is 
the protein system, and the genetic material then provides the 
information which describes each one of those proteins and where they 
occur and when they occur in the living organism. In a human being, 
there is somewhere between probably 20 and a couple of hundred 
thousand different proteins, not all of them are known, but all of 
them are encoded in one or a few molecules of DNA. And as indicated 
on this slide, DNA is a marvelous molecule. It's near the Christmas 
season, so red and green, but .:L"t~_§_...£__double str_g_n_Q~1=ID~.1~£\l.l!: and 
each strand is really related to the other strand in the sense that 
-22-
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one strand provides the information from which the other strand 
could be copied. And the DNA molecule is composed simply of four 
separate chemical entities. Those four separate chemical entities 
are arranged in different orders along the DNA molecule. In a human 
being, there are 46 such molecules in each one of the cells, and 
there are probably about ten billion of these four nucleotides arranged 
seemingly in monotonous fashion, but that actually in precisely 
regulated correspondence. And the length of those molecules, each 
one of those cells, has that number of chromesomes, they are called. 
The length, total length, might be about a meter, about three feet, 
but the molecule is so thin that you can't possibly see it. So 
there's ten billion entities all strung out in an extremely long set 
of molecules, and they are present, as I say, in two copies. Now 
in order to be expressed, the particular gene has to copy the DNA, 
and the term "transcribe" is used, much like transcription of a code 
is used, and what happens is that a copy of one of those DNA strands 
is made in a slightly modified structure, called RNA. It's a similar 
molecule, but only exists in a single strand and that molecule of 
RNA then is made in smaller, sort of gene-size units, and that 
molecule, interestingly enough, then is the one that is used to 
translate the record found in the DNA into the proteins which are 
found. Now, the proteins that we digested are not used in fact by 
the body,but are digested in the gut and they are digested to form 
amino-acids, abbreviated down here on the bottom. In fact, there 
are 20 of these as indicated earlier, and the way the molecular coding 
is changed from nucleic acid coding to the protein coding is via the 
organization of codons, small units in which th~~~--- o.t: __ _!!'l_~~-~--!-~~r __ _l?~par_~y-~ 
units are translated to a single amino acid. So that when arranged ----- -- --------------------M·--- 00 00- 0 ---- ~- - ------· --
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Those s e sets o condit s e ln every orp;anism 
from man to bact , and lass lCS s refers to the 
means by which the bas genet em and all this can be manipu-
lated, either by mutat or breeding. And as you know, most of 
the changes which have occurred for man-made uses have in the past 
utilized these breeding purposes or occasional mutat ns of s le 
organism,but most breeding. In breeding purposes, for sexual 
• reproduction, the that's important, is that the srr.s that 
part ipate in sexual contact, are f of all, phys ly compat 
sometimes psycholog ly compat and biologically compatible. 
That is to say, the cells have to be able to interact with one another. 
And in all of our logical systems, there is strong constraint on 
sexual reproduction between sms, such as to maintain species 
Now the remarkable thing, though, is that no matter which 
organism, whether 's man or , the coding rules are the same. 
The coding rules are precisely the same. That is to say, a single 
code that makes a given amlno acid ln a protein in a human, would 
also make that same ac a protein ln a bacteria or ln a 
yeast cell. Wherever you find '+ l '-. Now the only difference lS that 
ln organisms, lower and small, is that some of these regula-
t aspects of the genes are quite different. So you can't simply 
a human gene into a bacterium and expect the bacterium to deal 
with it; doesn't. 
, so now what ? Genetic engineer-
ing is a mechanism for manipulating the genetic apparatus beyond the 
class confines of sexual reproduction or mutation. And this can 
be done at the cellular level by mixing cells that otherwise wouldn't 
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es are ce 
0 c 
do 
the is det absolutely in sequence in order by the 
codon . But tead, lS nd on this slide, there are 
sequences of DNA which have nothing to do the f 
protein and those have to be spliced out before it can be used as a 
ic system. So we were to take out,for example, the gene for 
human from a human, and try to express bacteria, 
wouldn't work because the middle of the human insulin gene 
there lS a entro , one of those intervening sequences which 
would interrupt the cod sequence of the gene and which would 
confuse it. That intervening sequence in human insulin has to be 
eliminated before you can ut ize it as a system for expression in a 
a 
Now, how does this work in bacterium? The general strategy 
for engineering other organisms for man's purposes resolves around 
our lity to use other DNA systems, incorporate in them genes from 
higher organisms as has been mentioned by all three preceding speakers, 
and there are several ways to do this. You can incorporate the new 
gene directly into the chromosome, but most people currentl~ instead, 
incorporate it into small DNA pieces which exist in most micro-
sms, l yeast and bacteria, and replicate independent of 
the host genome. That is the genome which contains all of the 
ion for coding for proteins of the host that contains the 
chromosomes. And what was discovered some time ago in laboratories, 
most California--at Stanford and at University of California 
San Francisco--is that there was a means by which you could 
introduce foreign DNA molecules into such--reproducing small DNA 
part les called e virus particles which happen to infect 
bacteria or plasmid which replicate independently, but aren't 
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r~{' mnb :i DNA, so u 0 have uome way or uelccting, 
example, a s um out of a hundred mill or so and the 
lee has ln ch you mod one of the 
characters li1 the bact such that you can select the bacteria 
that has the recombinant, and s is an example of how this is done 
to give you a el for ho'VJ s operates the laboratory. Every one 
of these bacteria s has a icator so that can independ-
replicate an organism, and s particular plasmid has a 
both resistant to pencillin gene which makes the cell 
or ampicillin and , another antib Okay, now the 
consequence of that is that any bacterium which contains that 
will grow in the presence of those two ant lcs. Now 
there exists a c s the tetracycline gene where you can 
introduce that foreign piece of DNA; and when you introduce that 
foreign p of DNA, s the tetracycline gene such that 
the organism no longer is resistant to tetracycline, but is in fact, 
now sens to tetracycline. You, therefore, can select in huge 
populat of cells by just them out on plates and select 
your a hundred llion, necessary. In the bacterium, you'll 
select those bacter which are resistant to penic lin and sensit 
to tetracycline. Others would be completely sensitive to both and 
be lled or would be resistant to both and you could grow them, and 
those ones would then be the bacteria that you're interested in. So 
now the job, this kind of job, simply allows you to reproduce the 
DNA, bat by itself that DNA wouldn't express the gene. In order to 
express the gene, you have to re-put in the bacterium the signals 
from the bacterium, that is, the regulating part of a gene from the 
bacterium, and connect those in some way to the codons that are 
-29-
produced from the human ce ls. 
So each one of the be 
by the previous s, whether the 
or veast for express 
bacteria; the coding sequences come 
Okay, so that g 
what the process is about. C 
ly extendable to any em, that is 
produce, in le, any 
you can imagine the enormous on 
of useful molecules 
Now as the former z you, there 
have been the last four 
demonstrat of the ut 
on the one hand, molecules 




for the f molecules 
were 
use any l mo 
are a large nnmb"'Y' of other regnia+ory molecules in the human and 
1n an n 
a way 
of knm..; lf and 
30-
• 
Now as a f evidence of the power of the technology and 
an additional specific example, I want to turn to Hepatitis B, which 
was mentioned by Dr. Weissbach as a possible disease that could be 
treated by interferon; and I want to emphasize that this disease is, 
in fact, a huge public health problem in the world. At least 500 
million contract that disease and 200 million are carriers 
in the world. Now, aside from the disease itself,which can some-
times last several years, the virus is thought to produce hepato-
cellular carcinoma, that is liver tumors, which are the world's 
most prevalent cancers. Now the difficulty in studying this organism 
prior to, in fact, two or three years ago was the fact that you 
couldn't grow the organism outside humans and one species of chimpan-
zee. You couldn't grow it in tissue culture. Therefore, it was 
very d icult to study; it's impossible to make a vaccine. With 
the advent of recombinant DNA technology, it was possible to study 
the organism and indeed great progress has been made toward the 
development of the vaccine. Ordinarily, when a human is infected 
by Hepat is B, the liver produces virus particles, these large 
ones, some of which look 1 donut structures and then there are 
two other small particles, s one and the long lamentous icles 
which are produced in huge excess, and they contain only the surface 
of the v and not any DNA and recently scientists have shown that 
these particles can themselves be used as a vaccine. They're isolated 
from the serum of carrier patients, but the problem is that they're 
expensive and the total amount that would be available is extra-
ily limited. So the general aim then was to try to use Vlrus 
genes to produce the same protein that is ln those surface particles 
to form a vaccine, and my collegues and I were able to clone this 
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DR. RUTT~R: s 
's excellent for publ 
lS that? 
policy. 
lows the research to be carried 
out at a level and for the fruits of that research to be 
transferred to the use as rapidly as possible. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Do you think there oughL not to be a 
s ion between the sector and the academic sector? 
DR. RUTTER: There is a separation and there always will 
be a s ion between the and public sector, but I believe 
that there should be easy communication between the two of those 
groups; and tances where it is to public good for rapid trans-
fer of technology to exist, then this should be facilitated in order 
to accomplish these goals more rapidly. I can only say that had that 
not existed during the inception of the development of this new area 
of science, is no question that s utility would have occurred 
er seven years tead of 20. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You don't think that the influence of 
the sector upon the academic sector might have a negative 
t? 
DR. RUTTER: We're a situation where one sector of a 
soc s on another, there are effects; but in this particular 
case, my view, the good to society far exceeds any dangers which 
occur and I say as a member of the scientific committee that the 
perquisites that community and its responsibility in the universities 
lS jealously guarded by lts professors and will continue to be so 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Do you think that the state ought to 
ervene at this juncture to provide more regulatory vision in terms 
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of avoiding potential dangers or at least 
terms of regulation? 
DR. RUTTER: No, I do not, any necess 
legal intervention. The processes 
technology is occurring are adequate covered on the nat leve 
and are adequately considered by the var s councils 
ln the universities already. After s been a 
of transfer of technology, not so much 
that have been developed unlvers slcs area, 
handle 
of problem. Universities have , al 
developments the past have s and also have 
aided our country. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you lemen. 
1 to call on Lennett, s 
for the State Department of Health 
Director of the of 
Inst s of Health and 
Lennett. 
DR. EDWIN LENNETT: to 
myself so that you can ome 
remarks I'm go to make. 
ef of the V 
Division of Laboratories and Chief of the Bio~Med"ca·1 Section and a 
Deputy Director of what was then 
the Department of Health Services. 
consultant to the Divis of 
T 
J.. start out 
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conference was held and the consensus was announced through a letter 
pulJlished in Science, there was considerable surprise and even 
astonishment on the part of people in infectious diseases, in 
epidemiology, immunology, because they felt that if there had been 
more inpu~ there would not have been any ground for raising many 
of the scenarios which have been raised, and I should like to provide 
a little background for that. 
We did have behind us a long tradition of handling danger-
ous pathogens 1n the laboratory. Over those years there has been 
developed, as it were, a code of how you do things, knowledge which 
has not necessarily been written down, but was passed down through 
the universities by a preceptor system, which in my estimate has 
long since disappeared; and when I finally finish some of my academic 
colleagues may be incensed at my criticisms. In any case, to me the 
NIH guidelines represent what has been done for many, many years 
and for the first time has been codified and put into a format which 
everybody could understand and which should be followed. 
You ask me about the public health implications of genetic 
engineering. I would divide the possible potential hazards into two 
sections, one which would deal with the human element, and that in 
turn is a matter of education and training, and the second 1s physical 
containment. With respect to the former, I might go back and point 
out that human error is inevitable, and we had an instance of that 
not too many months ago in the Southern part of the state when a 
mislabeled virus was used in some of the experimental work. I don't 
know how we'll ever obviate that kind of an error. This could occur 
at any time. It also occurred in the past. The same institution 
some years back, when a virus which was labeled with one name, 
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vJh,l t wou 1 cl rJ e. Well, had an 
that ju years when the Veteran's Administrat 
Ho the Los s area was essential complet demolish-
ed by the earthquake, and that hospital were two highly pathogenic 
sms some amount. One was micro-bact tuberculosis; the 
other one was Coccidia s 1s, a highly pathogenic fungus 
produc lethal 
because immed ely after the demol 
happened,so far as we know, 
ion of that bu ing the entire 
area was sprayed with clorox solution and nothing, so far as we know, 
eventuated in that , so these laboratory accidents and even 
disasters, I think, can be contained, can be helped. I think the 
federal NIH, which really summate everything we know about the 
handling of disease incitants are adequate insofar as we know. None 
of the horrible scenarios that were devised and widely publicized 
have come to pass, and I think we have reasonable evidence now that 
the lines are If they are employed, we shouldn't 
have any problems. One quest which ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes, in fact the federal quidel s 
are , why is there some resistance on the part of this new 
tration Washington to deregulate those guidelines or at 
least not to support them as positively as others have; and that 
1s the case, ought not states to look at what their role should be 
terms of guidel s for research within their boundaries. 
DR. LENNETT: I think if the guidelines are followed, but 
I wanted to say the guidelines are followed, I can't see any great 
lems arising except, perhaps, on the side of the human factor. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: And your recommendation in that area 
would be? 
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DR. LENNETT: Well, I wanted to say that ln industry 
there's a long record of hav 
great hazard that I'm aware of; and 
plead for a much better education of the 
many w 
, I would 1 
who go into 
engineering from the standpoint of handling micro-organisms. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Rosenthal. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL: I'd just 1 to ask a quest 
no 
to 
about the NIH. It's been applied to all research at univers 
anybody receiving funds to do research. What about organizat 
s or 
that do not rece those funds? 
DR. LENNETT: Well, 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL: 
should follow the same ... 
should but do 
DR. LENNETT: Well, let me 
if I may. I would like to see, I'm 
like to see a return to class 
taught. Unfortunately, medical 
the horse ahead the cart 
not taught. What they do have are 
as such, but in effect they are 
genetics or departments of 
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of hol.<J to 
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restore some of this kind of 
sease s. And my plea l , 
so peop who go 
of genetic engineering have some cone of what's 
these pathogens, how they produce disease, how the diseas 
works, so that these are not ~j u u -
ing something, you follow me# A ist does not know too 
much about pathogenic microbia 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL Therefore, it seems to me that 
1 ne requ my ques to you, 1 whether or not 
h()U]d ply oui 'J trJe unJVCI' 1 a;; well , whether 
it should not also where e indus s fund the 
experiment. 
DR. LENNETT: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL: Does it? 
DR. LENNETT: It should 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL: Does it? 
DR. LENNETT: I don't know. The industry , Mr. 
Gartland can answer that better than I. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL: I don't know whether the NIH 
regulations apply; and if they don't, then it seems to me maybe we 
need something that says they have to. 
DR. LENNETT: Well, from what I heard this morning, they 
were utilized by the industry. The two speakers this morning, Mr. 
Kiley and ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: They were voluntarily complying. 
DR. LENNETT: Voluntary, that's right. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: On their own part and good faith. They 
are not appl , as I understand it, unless they receive grants 
from the Nat Inst es of Health, compulsory, jurisdictionally 
compulsory in adherence. Is that correct? 
DR. LENNETT: Well to me they only make good sense because 
and put into outline or summarize somewhere in the 
all of the things that use to be done in the medical 
field; and when the Departments of Microbiology were overwhelmed by 
cell biology aspects, this was no longer part so we need a whole 
new set of guidelines so that people can be educated in this field, 
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fort ick, , the bio warfare institution, they say 
here was the inest 
20-year per , there 
structure ever built and yet over a 
some 00 cases of laboratory infection. 
All right, but they were contained within those buildings; they never 
out into the community. Also, you follow the guidelines, 
which we 
are no di 
our own laboratory have been doing all these years; they 
from what we've been doing. In 1971, there was a 
pandemic of a brand new disease, acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis, 
which arose in Afr up through Asia, in Europe, produced 
llions of cases, and those of us in Berkeley, in Singapore, 
and in Tokyo and Houston, who worked with this agent, there wasn't 
a s le laboratory lOn. So you can contain these things 
you are aware of the techniques to be used. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So you feel that the NIH guidelines are 
more than adequate, if they are complied with? 
DR. LENNETT: Yes, I do. 
CHAIRMAN ~ORRES: And, number two, that we ought to be 
looking at improv or expanding the education of those people 
who deal these sms? 
DR. LENNETT: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you very much. Dr. Gartland, 
of the of DNA Activit s. 
DR. WILLIAM GARTLAND: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name 
lS William Gartland, and I'm Director of the Office of Recombinant 
DNA Activities at the National Institutes of Health. 
I'd like to speak briefly on the NIH guidelines for 
recombinant DNA research and on their current status. It was back 
in July of 1973, that participants at a conference on nucleic acids 
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onference and held ser s of meet s throughout 1975. And in 
recommended the first set of guide-
lines to the DirecTor oi he N The N then had a JC 
on these proposed guidelines February of 1976; and following 
cow~ents made at the hearing and a reconsideration of some proposals 
the RAC, the original guidelines were issued June of 1976. 
Major revisions of these guidel s were issued ln December of 1978, 
January and November of 1980, and July of 1981. And this history 
of the guidelines is extensively documented in a series of volumes 
ent led ''Recombinant DNA Research" which has been published by the 
NIH and is available from the government printing office. 
Now, the guidelines themselves, specify safeguards to be 
used in the course of experiments and these safeguards are provided 
by levels of physical and biological containment. Physical contain-
ment rel s f t of all, on a set of standard laboratory practices. 
And secondly, on spec procedures, equipment, and laboratory 
tallations that provide phys barriers between the investigator 
and the experiment. Physical containment is divided into four 
levels designated P 1, P 2, P 3, and P 4. P 1, which is the lowest 
level of containment, spec s the use of standard microbiological 
techniques. The P 2 level adds additional laboratory practices and 
the use of containment equipment such as biological safety cabinets 
for certain laboratory manipulations. The P 3 level requires special 
engineering design features and physical containment equipment. At 
the P 3 level, there is a requirement for negative air pressure, 
which means that air flows into the laboratory from the adjacent 
corridors and is discharged outside of the building and is not 
recirculated within the building unless it has been filtered. The 
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agreed to pose no novel hazards and are exempt from the requirements of 
the guidelines. These exemptions apply, first of all, to recombinant 
DNA molecules that are not organisms or v1ruses. In other words, 
when the DNA is being handled merely as a chemical. The second 
exemption is for recombinant molecules that consist of DNA segments 
from a single source. And this is cutting and pasting back together 
a single DNA molecule. The third exemption is for so-called self 
cloning experiments in which an investigator takes DNA from an 
organism, manipulates , and puts it back into the same organism. 
The fourth exemption is for recombinant DNA molecules composed of 
DNA segments from organisms that exchange genetic information and 
that appear on a list prepared by the Director of the NIH. And the 
fifth exemption is for certain other recombinant DNA molecules that 
are found not to present a significant risk to health or the environ-
ment. And many experiments involving three-host vector systems 
including the E-Coli K-12 host vector system have recently been added 
to this latter class of exempt experiments. 
The NIH guidelines are mandatory as has been stated here 
for titutions and investigators receiving funding from NIH or 
other federal agencies. Section 4 of the guidelines, which is entitled 
Roles and Responsibilities, specifies certain administrative require-
ments. Among these requirements are that an institutional biosafety 
committee must be established and that not less than 20% of the 
membership of that committee must be people who are not affiliated 
with the institution and who represent the interests of the surround-
ing community. The guidelines also require a biological safety 
officer if research is being conducted at the P 3 or P 4 level. 
Under the administrative section, the guidelines specify 
-45-
three classe of act 
sm was 
evolut A propo 
the s 
Federal lS er 
DNA 
comments that ha 
open sess and s 
proposal are 
recommendat D 








code of practice and to start treating recombinant DNA research as 
any other biological research would be treated. And that's the basic 
reason for their proposal. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: And the lowering of containment? 
DR. GARTLAND: The lowering of containment is not as 
extensive as it would appear. The proposal is that most containment 
can go down to the P 1 level unless other guidelines such as those 
that are issued by the Centers for Disease Control for handling 
epidemic pathogens would recommend a higher containment level. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Do you think these proposals are going 
to be accepted. 
DR. GARTLAND: Well, l~t me go on with the history a little 
bit. This proposal was considered by the Recombinant DNA Committee 
in April of this year and as a result of that, a working group was 
appointed to consider that proposal and other possible approaches 
to modifying the guidelines. And that working group met in June and 
July and developed its own proposed revision of the guidelines which 
was somewhat different than this Baltimore and Campbell proposal. 
Then this latter proposal and background documents that were prepared 
by the working group were considered by the Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee at s meeting on September 10 and 11, and the Committee 
voted to publish for comment a proposal that now incorporates some 
of the features of the working group proposal. And the vote of the 
Committee to publish this proposal for comment was 16 in favor and 
three opposed. 
I'd like to summarize what's in the proposal as it is now. 
F st of all, the proposal, as voted in September, would eliminate 
the prohibitions, although it would add back admonitions regarding 
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NANCY E. PfUND: I'd like to thank you for the opportunity 
to speak before this committee. I am currently a business school 
student, but I have been involved in the recombinant DNA issue for 
several years now as a research associate at the Stanford University 
School of Medicine and I've also been a consultant to the State's 
Hazard Alert System Berkeley. I have some familiarity with both 
the regulatory issues and the specifics of this particular technology. 
I'd like to talk today about the challenge before the State 
now ln terms of regulation and whether or not there is a role for 
state regulation. I think this is a particularly important issue ln 
light of what Dr. Gartland has just described in terms of the dis-
mantling of the apparatus or the possible dismantling of the federal 
apparatus. Before I go into a particular issue of regulation, I'd 
like to just briefly talk about the benefits and sks of the tech-
nology. We have heard this morning about the vast potential that this 
technology can bring in the field of health. And the field of 
wasn't mentioned, but it's another area where we're 
looking for benefits. I think that the progress that has been made 
toward useful appl ion and the development of risk assessment 
stud s have really been constructive in developing this technology 
ln a safe, appropriate manner. However, I think that there is some 
drawback to the constant image that this technology has in the media, 
the papers, and that is that there is one constant breakthrough 
after another. And I think that a tragic example of this is about a 
year and a half ago when Biogen announced its interferon accomplish-
ments. After that happened, it was mentioned as a possible cure for 
cancer. I talked to some interferon researchers, one of them at 
Stanford, and when that happened, he received voluminous calls from 
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to insufficient emphasis on control and detection of potentially 
adverse exposures." T L that this is a good t to talk about 
regulation. I think that compared to other technologies, this one 
has been -- the people in it have demonstrated a very impressive 
sensitivity to the need for cautious, safe development; and I think 
we should commend people for that, but when a lot of people that are 
involved in technology feel that this commendable record and the NIH 
guidelines obviates the need for regulation, which it is feared will 
only slow down progress in this very exciting new field. I don't 
think that this is necessarily the case. I think that there is a 
role for regulations and that it need not be burdensome. Extending 
the guidelines or some version thereof, to private industry, would 
only formalize and standardize what has taken place on an ad hoc 
basis, before. The experience of other states, such as Maryland, 
New York, and Massachusetts, shows that--and they have extended the 
guidelines at either the local level or the state level--shows that 
can be done and in these areas I have not seen the research come 
to a halt, nor have I seen in the literature that their innovativeness 
lS threatened because of a state regulatory apparatus. So regulation 
can bring uniformity to controls in the industrial sector, and a 
recent NIOSH study, preliminary study, looked at what industr s are 
doing on a voluntary basis and found that while their efforts are 
well-meaning, they are not always efficient and some of the areas that 
NIOSH felt needed work and needed uniformity in control included 
env , validation of culture inacti-
vation, and keeping of employee medical records. So that this is 
something that NIOSH is looking into now and there's no real federal 
activity in this area. 
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CHAIRMAN TORRES: Dr. 
that? 
DR. GARTLAND: We I 




that there was s var d 
the-art s a well s 
people to learn from the 
absence of act here 
role. And I that so 













ln technology should have a knowledge about the scientific base and 
the benefits and risks, as well as the social and political implica-
tions of a new technology. At the same time the second layer is 
those that are developing the technology, entrepreneurs, academic 
industrialists should also have a familiarity with what the public 
policy concerns are, that are spawned by their innovations. And I 
think that the reason we need this, this two-level approach, is 
because genetic engineering is a very important technology, and at 
the same time it's very controversial. The violations of the guide-
lines, the patent rules, the brisk competition that we hear about 
are just a slice of the debate. The religious groups and environmental 
groups, unions, that have really called for much more profound 
discussion of just how·we're going to develop this technology and 
should the public have some input, so that in some ways, state action 
can represent these other interests and make sure that there's an 
appropriately-paced development and not one that ignores or minimizes 
risks, or tries to patch them up rather than prevent them. And I 
think that in closing I'd just like to say that private industry, 
far from being hamstrung by state regulations, can enjoy significant 
gains from increased public acceptance, credibility, customer approval. 
I think that there is a role for establishing credibility with your 
potential, your future customers; and state regulation and a real 
cooperative development of this technology will really keep bio-
technology corporations in a positive light with the public, rather 
than a negative one. And, also, at the same time, will enable them 
to keep up with public preferences in product development. And so, 
I think, that ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Why don't we have some responses from 
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them since we have them here. Dr. Johnson or Dr. Weissbach from 
Roffman-LaRoche, do you have any response to Hs. P 's ? 
MS. PFUND: I just think that in any the ies 
involved should contribute to s and s scope and so 
think that industry's concern can be represented. I'm not 
that should be something forced on 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All 
DR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. I would l 
comment on about four points that Ms. Pfund has sed. I real 
favor ipation and discussion of these issues, and I 
think I'd be serving a us purpose as I f out there's been very 
broad public The RAC s member sent-
ing public groups, including un and groups of s sort. The 
National Academy of Sc held an open forum on s ect V>Jh 
was open to the publ and was ished as a book, very act 
part ipat many groups. I would once that 
this perception of at is real somewhat of a 
perception and you can debate a 1 le But every 
of the execut branch of the 1s represented as a non-
voting member of the RAC and every the 
1s a non-vot member of the RAC. And do take act ro e 
in s that the NIH areas that 
do regulate, whether it's the F.D.A. or 0 0 or 
Department of Agriculture. 
Now, there is one area I agree former 
and I 's l area. s 




that the concept of c by press conference was not a se 
to do for some of the same reasons she suggested. And I made a 
similar sort of criticism at a meeting in Rome several weeks ago, 
and I'll be glad to provide you with a copy of my remarks on that 
ect. 
Where that's happened is when the young entrepreneurial 
companies ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Excuse me. What month were they published? 
DR. JOHNSON: Pardon? 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What month of the New England Journal? 
DR. JOHNSON: I don't remember off-hand, but I'll supply 
you with a copy of that as well. 
But where this has happened though, it's really been the 
young entrepreneurial companies, not the well-established companies 
that have been in business for many years and they have somewhat 
different motives for this, I believe. 
She also mentioned the problem of air sampling and validation, 
things of this sort, and the manufacturing data that we have to supply 
the F.D.A., for example. We validate every tank, in terms of the fact 
that we can prove beyond any reasonable doubt that we killed every 
organism in that tank. We do have very severe air sampling around 
all the tanks containing recombinant organisms. We've been doing 
-scale fermentation of recombinant organisms now for over two 
years, and we have yet to detect an organism that got out of the 
tank. 
I think her point was that people who have not had as much 
experience as we have had might not do it the same way, but my 
feeling is that the F.D.A. will insist and other regulatory agencies 
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will insist that they do that. And so we are really regulated and 
mandated. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Do you want to re 
MS. PFUND: I was merely ... 
, Ms. Pfund? 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: In the mike please, Ms. 
MS. PFUND: I was merely quoting a from NI 
which esentially that while there are leader es t 
of handling the materials, some of the llower companies don't 
the techniques, just as you des And that to say 
"well, you'll have to improve your 
," is sort of a backwards way to 
applications will necessarily go 
some of the agricultural applications 
federal agency, and so it's sort a p 
s because the F.D.A. 
because not all the 
the F.D.A. For 
s go through a different 
approach; and rather 
than having confl ing, standards create headache 
for everyone, luding those that are 
you have some that made 




could do , and 
could call if they 't know to do I 
you would really be doing a s e and not ld too much of 
a ld. 
DR. JOHNSON: Just make one other 
sh to is the po that made Dr. Lennett. What 
assessment has proven is that you cannot make an 
more dangerous than the sm from the DNA, and 
the that medical, l 




CHAIRMAN TORRES: Alright, but one last question, and I 
life organism developed to eat up oil spills. My very simple 
question is, what happens when the organism is full? 
DR. JOHNSON: The organism is so designed that it would 
die. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So it's like ... 
DR. JOHNSON: Now, let me raise one other point as well . 
Some of these other issues are under active consideration. For 
example, there is a presidential commission of biomedical ethics, 
and this is the same commission that considered research utilizing 
prisoners and fetal research and developed federal guidelines ln 
this area. And they are actively considering, at the request of 
three different religious groups, the biomedical ethics as it applies 
to man. And they have not yet issued their first report, although 
it's my understanding that a draft of that report has been prepared. 
But it is under active consideration. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Dr. Weissbach, do you want to respond or 
Mr. Kiley respond? You're not necessarily required to; it's just 
you feel the urge to. 
DR. WEISSBACH: Well, actually Dr. Johnson mentioned many 
of the points that I wanted to bring up. I'd just like to say that 
these discussions among industry, academia and the government took 
place in New Jersey, and the basic question that had to be decided--
was there a significant potential risk, and I think that's what you 
have to decide. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: That's right. 
DR. WEISSBACH: And I think in New Jersey, it was decided 
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there wasn't signif 1 risk or of it to warrant 
separate state slat 
TORRES: All r 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL: But, Doctor, are 
states that have not come to that conclus As a matt 
I just heard ... 
DR. WEISSBACH: Oh, I state ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL: Two states. 
DR. WEISSBACH: ... and some s ' 
can just comment on the New York--what the 
simply is: 11 Follow the NIH s.n 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL. Does that to ? 
DR. WEISS Yes, to everyone. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL: s re 
to that? Did the 
DR. WE SSBACH I 
ls, s i~ needed? 
ASSEMBLYMAN 
needed or not, but the the average c 
about what can 
s terms nuc 
are now 
have to have those gu exc 
stances, 11 then I not c 
people. 
BACH: Y 
k versus a potential risk, and the instances you are giving arc 
known risks. In the case of recombinant DNA technology, there lS no 
known risk, as has been brought up time and time again; and the 
potential risk agaln appears very, very slight. So slight that most 
scientists feel that it should not be handled any differently than 
other biological research which has not been regulated. 
MS. PFUND: Can I just make a point? 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Absolutely. 
MS. PFUND: I think that what you're getting at is a lot 
more important than just risk and benefit. I think it has to do 
with the people's perception of technology and how useful it is, 
and yet what risks there may be in it. An experience I had a few 
years ago, just in the leadership of the California State Federation 
of Labor on this subject was instructive. There I found a real 
enthusiasm for this technology and for some of the products and 
processes that it might bring; and yet at the same time, individuals 
from various unions wanted to make sure that the mistakes of previous 
technology were not repeated. That, whether it's potential or real 
risk, that there was some effort made to prevent unnecessary exposures 
and to record and document the history of human exposures. So that, 
I that that's not just confined to a labor audience. The 
people in California really are sensitive to human, environmental, 
ethical concerns and want to make sure that there's some mechanism 
for those concerns to be represented in the development of a new 
technology, and I don't think that that's the same as being anti-
technology. I don't think so at all. I think that people are looking 
forward to the benefits and that these companies will be looked on 
with favor when the actual products come out. But I think that if we 
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can create an environment where we're communicating and and 
exchanging information rather than just clos off scuss 
we'll be much better off. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL: That's my feel I'm not s 
regulations which are going to prohibit the outcomes because the 
possibilities are astounding in terms of what could soc 
But at the same time, the more people who are gett 
this particular process may not be the large s, may not 
the universities, and we may have some individuals smaller 
establishments and laboratories doing some things that 
ought not to be do ; and if, fact, word gets out that the 
federal government is now, you know, turning it back to the states, 
as they are doing with everything else, then we ought to take 
a look at, here in California, as to what the federal government is 
not going to provide terms of some s s to these 
regulations. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Dr. Lennett. 
DR. LENNETT: Well, there's 
me, out of the November, 1981 issue of 
two s. have before 
and there 
was an interesting The Massachusetts Health Assoc 
is going to release s month a model for 
DNA research, and the interest comment is the 
comply with lines set by the DNA Advisory ee 
published on July 1, and you maintain adequate medical survel~lance 
for your , the model ance cau e no or 
co t for the f 
The other, appropos to what you're about some of 
these fears, the people who give se to these are a l 
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loose with the truth on occasion; and if you go far enough you'll 
finrl thQt there ~rc other considerations which have not been ment 
Now, one of these, for example, that E. Coli produces mening s, 
neonatal meningitis. Now that's a rare disease, isn't very 
common. And Robbins down at the Bureau of Biologics investigated 
some of these cases, and much to their surprise, they found that s 
was E. Coli, but it had an overcode derived from Neisseria Meningo-
coccus . In other words, was recombination in nature. So this 
wasn't mentioned; it was just that E. Coli is the villain. It 
became a villain only because of recombination in nature. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well, we also found out just recently 
almost a year ago, during the DBCP hearing that we conducted in 
Fresno, that DBCP is created naturally, as well as artificially. So 
it was an interesting combination and comparison as well. 
Any further questions? 
I'm deeply appreciative of all of the participants, and 
we will hope to be in contact with you again as we pursue what we 
feel the solution ought to be. 
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DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, governs 
functions of all life on earth. It is central r 
for the information that each species r 
course of three billion years of evo 
all of the biological information whi to 
reproduce themselves, to produce their 
to perform the functions necessary 
The genetic "language" of DNA 
to carry their protein-producing 
This means that bacteria can use 
the proteins which govern the pro ion 
human mothers. And some of the prate 
cells make are still remarkably s la 
Widely different cells can "read" e 
sometimes use each other's DNA to 
In large part, it is these r 
which makes possible the success and 
research into genetic structure and 
Recombinant DNA (rDNA) involves 
information from one organism to ano comple 
organism. While a vast number of tentia 
benefits of recombinant DNA rese e 
scientific community has also 
environmental and human heal 
The genetic alterat of plants, 
organisms has been an important part o 
centuries. However, only in last 2 
new genetic technologies been devel ed 
the ability to manipulate 
plants, animals, and micro-o 
the increasing reliance the 
industries are plac on biotechnolo 
are being used to 
been extracted from natural 
breeders are using the new 
questions about biolog al 
speed and e iciency of the te 
Other industries - from d 




er of tic 
ely unrelated 
ti 






Recombinant DNA research and use of these products, are 
go on in public and private laboratories in various 
places in the United States and reign countries. Many 
concerned scientists are arful that without stringent 
controls, serious risks exist. Because of the risk, the 
National Institute of Health has prohibited some recombinant 
DNA experiments and restricted others. 
The immediate issue now re the California Legislature 
is whether state action is necessary to offset a decreasing 
fe ral regulation and overs of rDNA uses. 
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BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Biotechnology - the use of 1 anisms or ir 
components in industrial processes - s ss e because 
micro-organisms naturally produce count e s stances 
during their lives. Some of these s stances have 
commercially valuable. A number of dif ent 
have learned to use micro-
cultivating populations of 
designed to enhance their 
Applied genetics can play 
speed, efficiency, and product 
systems. It permits the man at 
the micro-organisms' genetic mat 
characteristics. Genetic eng er 
industry, but a technique used 
allows the researcher to modi 
the ce11. The population of a ter 
grow from the first changed micro-
for various industrial processes. 
Major commercial emphasis 
genetic engineering are the areas o 
o Pharmaceutical indus 
o Chemical indust 
o Food processing t 
o Pollution control 
ic on of 
A 
Appendix A 
l'hnnn;lcPtlt icnl lndu,:trv: 
The pharmaccut iced ndustry has been the rirst to take 
advantage of the potentials of applied molecular genetics. 
Ultimately, it will probably benefit more than any other, 
with the largest percentage of its products depending on 
advances in genetic technologies. 
The domestic sales of prescription drugs by U.S. 
pharmaceutical companies exceeded $7.5 billion in 1979. Of 
these, approximately 20 percent were products for which 
fermentation processes played a significant role. They 
included anti-infective agents, vitamins, and biologicals, 
such as vaccines and hormones. G(?Iletics is expected to be 
pa.rJ.!<::_lilarly ltsefu1 in the production of these pharmaceuticals 
and biologicals, which can only be obtained by extraction 
from human or animal tissues and fluids. 
Two major factors triggered the use of genetics in the 
pharmaceutical industry: 
o The biological sources of many pharmacologically active 
products are micro-organisms, which are readily amenable 
to genetic engineering. 
o The major advances in molecular genetic engineering 
have been made under an institutional structure that 
allocates funds largely to biomedical research. Hence, 
the Federal support system has tended to foster studies 
that have as their ostensible goal, the improvement of 
health. 
The products most likely to be affected by genetic engineering 
in the next 10 to 20 years are nonprotein compounds like 
most antib tics, and prate compounds such as enzymes and 
antibodies, and many hormones and vaccines. Improvements 
can be made both in the products and in the processes by 
ich they are produced. Process costs may be lowered and 
even entirely new products developed. 
Synthetic ulin, growth hormones, antibiotics as well 
as more exotic compounds such as interferon are seen as the 
most likely short-term products. The following table identifies 
projected domestic sales of products currently being developed. 
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TABLE 1 
PROJECTED U.S. MARKETS FOR 
RECOMBINANT DNA PRODUCTS 
























Chemic 1 Industry: 
The chemical indus currently utilizes the technology 
of convert coal to organic icals, and a readily 
available supply of coal exists. Coal-based technologies 
will be used to produce a wide array of organic chemicals in 
near e. Never less economic, environmental, and 
technical factors will increase industry's interest in 
biomass as an alternative source for raw materials. Biomass 
s been transformed fermentation into organic chemicals, 
and in theory, most any industrial organic chemical can be 
produced by a biological process. Commercial fermentation 
using genetically engineered micro-organisms offers several 
advantages over current chemical production techniques. 
o The use of renewable resources: starches, sugars, 
cellulose, and other components of biomass can serve as 
the raw material for synthesiz organic chemicals. 
With proper agricultural management, biomass can assure 
a continuous renewable supply for the industry. 
o The use of physically milder conditions: chemical 
processes often require hi temperatures and extreme 
pressures. These conditions are energy intensive and 
pose a hazard in case of accidents. Biological processes 
operate under milder conditions, which are compatible 
with living systems. 
o One-step production metho micro-organisms can carry 
out several steps in a synthetic process, eliminating 
the need for intermediate steps of separation and 
purification. 
Decreased lution: cause biological processes are 
i y specific in the reactions they catalyze, they 
o r control over products formed and decrease 
undesirable si -products. As a result, they produce 
pollutants that require management and disposal. 
Food Process Indus 
The food processing industry comprises those manufacturers 
that transform or process agricultural products into edible 
products for market. It is distinguished from the production, 
or farming and breeding portions of the agricultural industry. 
Genetics can be us in the food processing industry in 
two ways: to design micro-organisms that transform inedible 









The Oil and Hazardous Materials Spills Branch of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), currently supports 
research aimed at isolating organisms to degrade specific 
chemical compounds. The best known research in this area is 
that of Dr. Ananda M. Chakrabarty who engineered two strains 
of "pseudomonas", each of which has the ability to degrade 
the four classes of chemicals found in oil spills. Neither 
of the pseudomonas strains engineered presents a threat to 
human health. 
EPA currently limits its support to research aimed at 
selecting indigenous microbes, an area that has already 
attracted some commercial research support. Commercial 
firms are looking for large-scale markets, such as sewerage 
systems, or commonly occurring smaller markets, such as 












REGllU\TTON Of GENETTC ENGTNEERTNG 
~ '~· ·~ '"-
Although no evidence exists that any harmful organism 
has been created by molecular genetic techniques, most 
experts believe that some risk is associated with genetic 
engineering. One kind is relatively certain and quanti-
fiable - that of working with known toxins or pathogens. 
Another is uncertain and hypothetical - that of the possible 
creation of a pathogenic or otherwise undesirable organism 
by reshuffling genes thought to be harmless. These may be 
thought of as physical risks because they concern human 
health or the environment. 
An example of "physical risk" associated with genetic 
engineering, compounded by inadequate security measures, 
mishandling of products, or apparent impropriety by research, 
was demonstrated last year at the University of California, 
San Diego. A violation of the recombinant DNA safety rules 
led to the wrong virus being cloned. Whether the virus, 
whose cloning was prohibited by the National Institution of 
!1ealth (NIH), was accidentally cloned, or intentionally 
cloned, is unclear. But the possibility of accidental 
cloning can occur. Adding to this drama, was the theft of a 
bottle of rabies vaccine from the biology laboratory by a 
person, or persons unknown, who was objecting to recombinant 
DNA research. The rabies vaccine was left opened in a public 
place for 24 hours before it was recovered. Fortunately, 
there was no hazard to human health as a result of this 
situation. 
The issue of whether or not to regulate molecular 
genetic techniques - and if so, to what extent - defies a 
simple solution. Perceptions of the nature, magnitude, and 
acceptability of the risks differ drastically. Approximately 
6 years ago, when the scientific community itself accepted a 
moratorium on certain classes of recombinant DNA (rDNA) 
research, some scientists considered the concern unnecessary. 
Today, even though the physical risks of rDNA research are 
generally considered to be less than originally feared, some 
people would still prohibit research. 
There has always been an attitude that scientists are 
qualified to assess their own physical risk, since this 
involves measuring and evaluating technical data. Subsequently, 
they feel that regulation of scientific activities should be 
left to the scientific community. However a ·ud ment of 
e accep a 1 1ty o t at risk) can only be made by 
society through the political process, since it involves 
weighing and choosing among values. Scientists are not 
necessarily considered to be more qualified to make decisions 











continu concerns over several basic issues 
controver ial at this point in time, 
re a st of resolution. 
0 Can the micro-organisms us in genetic engineering, 
even controll conditions, accidentally 
esc e to outs environment? Would these 
micro-organisms present a health hazard? 
o Can toxic or potentially toxic micro-organisms be 
ace ental cloned? 
o In the event of an accident caused by a molecular 
genetic te ique, and the micro-organisms involved 
creates a alth hazard, who assumes the liability? 
Is it appropria e State of California to now 
ate regulat s apply to genetic engineering 
activities within state? Even though the physical risks 
re less than orig 11 ared, is genetic engineering so 
e today that no re ations are required to protect the 









vert rate tox 
en(U x A 




of vector st must be chosen to 
survival of the system outside of the 
transmission of the vector to 
nonl oTatory 
containment: 
st . e are e levels of biological 
HVl - Requires use of Escherichia coli K12 or 
other we d st ains of micro-organisms 
are less able to live outside the 
laboratory. 
HV2 Requires the use of s cially eng ered strains 





li t ents e absence of certain 
uncommon 
- No organ sm 
qualify as 
ical c 
s t been developed that can 
'Z 
J. 
cial aborato ies (P -P4) 
Good es, trained personnel, 
Biohazar 
ild 




in vacuum line, 
Monol t c construction, air 
contaminate , autoclave in 
rime s i C ass II sa 
love box), s r room. 
- 7 8-
locks, all air 
room, all 
ty cab ts 










I would like to to some of the 
presents. comments will fall into three categories: 
and risks ion and literacy. 
In recent years, has achieved widespread 
• Almost weekly, we read of new genetic promising upcoming cancer cures, energy-saving , and increased agricultural efficiency. 
in contrast to the environment four years ago, when this 
committee heard scientists talk more about risk than benefit, and urge 
caution. 
Of course, new knowledge has worked to lessen fears of biohazards 
from this , and much progress has been made towards 
useful Yet, s climate, where enthusiasm about benefits 
concern about risks, presents a 
and creates unrealis expectations. Cancer patients call 
interferon researchers, offering huge sums of money for a dose 
the current scientific evidence for interferon's effectiveness in 
- .2 • i 1 many types ot cancer kS at best suggest ve. • a prominent 
the imminent 2 human growth hormone. While 
that this improve our ability to 
deal he argues that the crucial role in 
human that our efforts spent improving the diets 
children. 
Tes of Pfund 
December 1, 1981 
page 2 
At the same time, the National firs 
drafted 1976, are all but historic 
risk-assessment are different 
recombinant DNA With 
cuts federal health 
sys 
health factors become 





of Pfund endix B 
1, 1981 
found efforts 
in the areas of environmental 
culture inactivation, and of 
medical records. In the absence of federal action in these areas, 
874 of the California Code--the Workers' to Know Law--
be and enhanced. 
A second argument for comes from the of other 
and localities. In Boston, and , Massachusetts, 
example, ordinances sett up • governmental oversight, 
mechanis~s between and the government have 
research and to halt and that area is not 
in any danger of due to legislative action. 
to a two-layered orientation. 
that consumers and those not expert in a given 
have a of 's scientific base, 
and risks, as well as its social, , and economic implications. 
consists o those (academics, 
) 
their innovations. 
The ustification for literacy in the field 
for the future. While news of benefits speaks to the power 
, there is much evidence of controversy. The handful 
violations researchers of the NIH guidelines, disputed 
research ties, landmark patenting rules, and the brisk 
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Testimony of Nancy Pfund 
December 1, 1981 
page 4 
corporate competition displayed increas 
indices represent just a slice of the debate. 
organizations, and a host of other 
have called for caution and have 
take that 
rate of return on inves 
A mechanism to foster communication 
in and affected the new genetic 
confining. Ordinances in 
X B 







the oversight process by setting up biohazards committees whose 
composition reflects a wide range of or not this model, 
or something similar, would work in California a matter for further 
discussion. I mention it only to show that State action can have the effect 
of educating on a variety of subjects to an of and so foster 
In • I would like to • far from 
by State involvement, can 
, consumer awareness • An 
issue to the 
of the California State instructive. 
There, I witnessed a shared 
in order to avoid the mistakes of •also saw 
an enthusiasm for the recombinant 
that it might Incidents like 
feedback amongst workers, managers, 
customers in order to establish a 
and in 
• 
of Nancy Pfund 
December 1, 1981 
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5 
of many--from labor to 
ie in enviable 
of a technical leader this exciting field. The 
available now for leadership in a responsible public policy 
the 's should not go unexercised. 
To summarize, then, I would like to leave you with three 
Biotechnology's current image is 
No technology is 100% safe, the risks of recorrbinant 
DNA merit attention. Furthermore, even benefits carry 
with them of their and we must strive to the 
) can and need not stand in the way of progress 
Current voluntary leave gaps in safety procedures 
that formal standards could fill. Other states and localities 
have recognized this, and their innovativeness has not suffered 
as a result. 
( The DNA is enough to require that widespread 
education and involvement accompany its development. 
lends credibility to the 
• and fosters appropriate 
• Thomas , Stanford University 
John D. Crawford, M.D., 
16, 1981, Vol. 305, No. 3, pp. 163-164. 
3. Recombinant DNA Technical Bulletin," National Institutes of Health, Spring 1981. 
, page 63. 
80 Vicente 
Berkeley, California 94705 
(415) 845-7565 
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La Roche established a recombinant DNA Biosafety Committee. This committee 
includes scientists knowl le n these techniques as well as indi-
vi~uals representing the , medical, and ethical aspects of this new 
technology. In addition, health officers from surrounding communities and 
a scientist from a local university are members of this committee. The 
committee reviews and evaluates all Roche research involving recombinant 
DNA to ensure that involved personnel are properly trained, safety 
precautions are followed, appropriate facilities are used, and that all 
experiments meet NIH guidelines. 
Thus, the current involvement that Hoffmann-la Roche has in recombinant DNA 
technology and the specific application of these modern techniques in the 
production of interferon arose from the research efforts underway for many 
years at the Roche Institute. As a specific example, one scientist from the 
Roche Institute has been carrying out research on interferon for more than 
10 years. 
Interferon was described in 1957 by Isaacs and Lindenmann who showed that 
ce ls exposed to a virus can produce a substance that protects cells against 
v rus infection ( t A). It is now clear that there are three major 
interferon (leukocyte, fibroblast, and immune) and that leukocyte 
interferon actually is a group of 12 or more closely related proteins 
(Attachment B). 
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Initi clinical studies with crude 
human cells indicated it might 
and cancer and, therefore, this 
However, the difficulty in 
human cells by conventional 
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were successful in tran 
li cells engineering the 
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are summari in 
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2 stud es, some ch 
ne efficacy in a var 
those listed in Attachment E. 
clinically effective, it should 
nology to produce this s 
reasonable cost. 
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y begun. wil be carri 
ndix C: 
out to 
ies v ra conditions such as 
nant interferon is shown to be 
ible using recombinant DNA tech-
in sufficient quantities and at a 
This research on interferon is i lustrative of several trends today in the 
complex drug discovery and development process. First, this program 
provides an excellent example of how basic research and new technologies in 
modern molecular genetics can be used for the development of new pharma-
ceuticals. Second, the process nvo ves the unique interaction of a 
critical mass of scientists in a variety of disciplines who must work 
together closely to achieve the desi goal. Third, substances such as 
interferon are active at ~xtremely ow dose levels so that new procedures 
measurement and detection become necessary. This presents a challenge 
and often requires costly, sophisticated instrumentation. 
In whil the research and lopment process is complex, 
quali 
s i ve and , the rewards to society are cons i derab 1 e: the 
on, treatment and cure many diseases; the enhancement of the 
of human lives; and the containment of overall health care costs. 
challenge before us is to stimulate the incentives for research and to 
recognize that our scientific efforts represent a vital national resource. 
We are encouraged by the positive interest of the California State Assembly 
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Appendix C 
in our research activities, for we bel eve that innovation and discovery 
should be our common goal and active1 l. 
Thank you for this opportun ty to 
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ATTACHMENT E Appendix C 
DISEASES BEING INVESTIGATED 
Cancer Viral 
Breast Herpes Zoster 
Ill Lung Herpes Keratitis 








THE SALK INSTITUTE Appendix D 
I know that in your wisdom as Chairman of this Committee you will 
see the benefits of this science and find ways for the government of 
California to take a leadership role for the rest of the world in 
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ion in its new form.l The National 
Institute of Health ) , an agency within the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services,2 has adopted 
guidelines for recombinant DNA research.3 Essentially, these 
guidelines prescribe safety procedures, and the biological 
and physical containment procedures under which permitted 
recombinant DNA research should be conducted. The guidelines 
promulgated by NIH apply to projects supported by grants 
made to non-Federal public institutes and private non-profit 
institutes selected by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services for this research.4 However, the NIH guidelines are 
not generally enforceable.5 Currently, there are no provisions 
in state law which require any public agency to license, 
regulate, or otherwise give special approval for research 
projects utilizing recombinant DNA. There are no local 
governmental attempts to regulate research utilizing recombinant 
DNA. 
The California Tort Claims Act (Div. 3.6 (com-
mencing with Sec. 810), Title 1, Gov. C.)6 provides for 
claims and actions against public entities and public 
employees and bars tort actions against public entities not 
within its comprehension (Hays v. State, 231 Cal. App. 2d 
48, 49-50). In this regard, the University of California is 
a public trust governed by a corporation known as the Regents 
of the University of California (Sec. 9, Art. IX, Cal. Const.) 
and, for the purposes of governmental liability, is a public 
entity (see Sec. 811.2). 
The California Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1963,7 
a the California Supreme Court abrogated the long-standing, 
judicially-declared doctrine of governmental tort immunity (see 
--~'-o,_.. 










Why Recombinant DNA? 51 Southern 
973. 
See 42 U.S.C.A., Sec. 203. 
National Institute of Health, Guidelines for Research 
Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 46 Fed. Reg., No. 
126, at p. 34462. 
See 42 n.s.c.A., Sec. 2891 1. 
46 Fed. Reg. No. 126, Sec. IV-B, at pp. 34475-34476. 
All statutory references are to the Government Code, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
The act was enacted in six separate statutes (see Chs. 
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of 
the same 
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9). Thus, 
due care, and 
be 
a failure 
A failure to exercise due care can be in 
various ways. In a field, such as recombinant DNA 
research, expert could be used to establish 
standard of care. 
a statute, 
jury se to a 
Sec. 669, Evid. C.). 
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California 
research, vlhich, lated, 
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Beach, 24 Cal. 3d 238, 241-246, Mark v. & 
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"(l) the statute, 
ordinance, or what 
reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary 
prudence, acting under similar circumstances, 
who desired to comply with the law ... 
* * *" (Emphasis added.) 
We note, however, that compliance with a statute or 
regulation does not always lead to a holding that the person 
is not negligent (Hubbard-Hall Co. v. Silverman 340 
F. ~402, 405). The defendant in a negligence 
still exercise the care required under common law--that care 
which would be exercised by a person of ordinary prudence in 
the same circumstances possessing the same knowledge. 
We thus conclude that the enactment of NIH guidel s 
on recombinant DNA research into law would define the standard 
of care required by persons or institutions conducting recombinant 
DNA research. An act or omission which violates this law would 
raise a rebuttable presumption of negligence. 
:dse 
Very truly yours, 
Bion H. Gregory 
Legislative Counsel 
/) /i A. J, ~ ~Jv__'~ By /,::;r{/1../~s.t.'> (1 / 
Sandra Hughes 
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repeal Chapter 2.5 
of Division 20 of 
to genetic research. 
e ix F 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 3549, Torres. Genetic research. 
(1) Under existing law, there exist no provisions which 
require any public agency to license, regulate, or 
otherwise give special approval for research projects 
utilizing recombinant DNA genetic research activity. 
The National Institutes of Health, an agency within the 
United States Department of Health and 
Services, has adopted guidelines for recombinant 
research. These guidelines prescribe safety procedures, 
and the biological and physical containment procedures 
under which permitted recombinant DNA research 
should be conducted. The guidelines promulgated by 
National Institutes of Health apply to projects supported 
by grants made to nonfederal public 
private, nonprofit institutes selected by the Secretary 
Health and Human Services for this research. The 
guidelines presently are not generally enforceable. 
This would enact the California Recombinant DNA 
Safety Act of 1982 relating to such research. 
The bill would require all recombinant DNA 
research out under the auspices 
agency, or organization of the 
to comply with the applicable N.LH. 
would also specify that any civil or 
that a person violated those 
that the person failed to 
created a rebuttable 
of proof. 
specify that compliance with 
provisions of California Recombinant DNA Safety Act 
of 1982 shall not be construed to require disclosure of 
trade secret mformahon without assurance of 
confidentiality. 
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